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In a paper published recently in the Journal of Philosophy, Mario Gómez-Torrente provides a 
methodological argument for the “disquotational,” Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation. 
Gómez-Torrente’s previous work has greatly contributed to making this theory perhaps the most 
widely supported view of pure quotation in recent years, against all other theories including the 
Davidsonian, demonstrative view for which I myself have argued. Gómez-Torrente argues that 
rival views make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon.” I aim to turn the 
methodological tables. I reply to his objections to my own version of a demonstrative account, 
and I show that disquotational proposals provide no better account of the data. I also show that, 
unlike the demonstrative account, disquotational views make an ungrounded distinction between 
quotations that semantically refer to their intuitive referents and others that merely speaker-




Gómez-Torrente advances a methodological argument in favor of the “disquotational”, 
Tarski-inspired theory of pure quotation, DT, which he has been contributing to make the 
perhaps most widely supported view in recent years,1 against all other theories including the 
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Davidsonian, demonstrative Deferred Ostension DO view that I myself favor. He argues that 
they all make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” (op. cit., 353). In this paper I 
aim to turn the methodological tables on him. I will reply to Gómez-Torrente’s objections to DO, 
and I will show that DT fares no better on the data he brings to bear. To tip the scale, I will show 
that, unlike DO, DT creates a division in the interpretation of quotations for which its proponents 
have not given any good support, by distinguishing those which semantically refer to their 
intuitive referents, and those which merely speaker-refer to them.2 I’ll conclude that DO still 
affords the “loveliest” explanations.3 
 
 
1. Deferred Ostension vs. Disquotational Theories of Pure Quotation 
 
In the pure uses that will occupy us, quotations occupy the argument positions that referential 
expressions such as proper names, descriptions and indexicals and demonstratives fill up; to that 
extent they seem to be referential expressions themselves. Thus, consider (1): 
(1) ‘Boston’ is disyllabic. 
Washington helpfully identified three questions that a theory of pure quotation should 
address, and on the basis of which they can be classified:4 (i) what part of a quotation has a 
referring role, (ii) what is the reference of that referring part, and (iii) how that reference is fixed. 
According to DO, quotation marks are the linguistic bearers of reference, functioning like a 
dedicated demonstrative; the token quoted material plays the role of a demonstrated index; any 
expression appropriately related to the index might be the referent;5 reference is fixed by some 
contextually suggested relation in which the referent stands to the quoted material. In central 
cases, the relation is: … instantiates the linguistic expression __, but there are other possibilities 
settled by whatever determines the semantic referents of demonstratives, speaker’s intentions or 
 - 3 - 
contextual factors. Quotation marks are thus on DO dedicated demonstratives whose character 
can be articulated as the expression in the salient relation to the quoted material.6  
DO does not deny that the quoted material (and the quotation as a whole as a result) also 
count as referring expressions on ordinary, intuitive conceptions of reference and expression. For 
we intuitively describe indexes in regular cases of deferred ostension as referring to whatever 
they help refer to; and ordinary language is unabashedly polysemous in any case. DO only 
contends that, in a strict theoretical sense of referring device in which only tokens of linguistic 
lexical types that have a referring function in the system of a language are such, it is tokens of 
quotation marks that are the referring devices in quotation; only they convey semantic reference. 
There is a significant difference that we should however note between such dedicated 
demonstratives and ordinary ones, including complex demonstratives like ‘this expression’ that 
explicitly articulate the sortal applying to their referents in successful uses. Unlike the latter, 
quotations already come with indexes to serve as demonstrata. As a result, given metasemantic 
rules for demonstratives to be discussed below, a default demonstrative rule for quotations, 
DDR, can always safely operate in any context in which they are uttered:7 
(DDR) A quotation refers to the most salient expression that the quoted material instantiates. 
DDR is just a default. DO accounts on the basis of exactly the same metasemantic 
explanations applying to other demonstratives for the fact that we do not merely refer with 
quotations to linguistic expression, but (in the appropriate contexts) also to other expressions 
related in some way to the token we use: features exhibited by the token distinct from those 
constituting its linguistic type, as in (2); features exhibited by other tokens of the same type but 
not by the one actually used, as in (3); other related tokens, as in (4).8 
(2) Use ‘Velázquez’, not ‘Velásquez’. 
(3) ‘Hiss’ is a hissing sound. 
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(4) ‘Batman’ is painted in black. 
In order to motivate DT’s contrasting answers to Washington’s questions, let me first present 
an objection that Gómez-Torrente raises against Davidsonian theories, part of the reason why 
according to him these theories make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous phenomenon” 
(“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 133; “Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and 
What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 141; “How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 359; cf. also Cappelen and 
Lepore, Language Turned on Itself, op. cit., pp. 69-70). The objection assumes the intuitive truth 
of disquotational schemas for quotations such as the one this instantiates: 
(5) ‘ ‘Socrates’ ’ stands for (refers to, denotes) ‘Socrates’. 
One of the problems that (5) is said to pose specifically for DO goes as follows – I’ll discuss 
others in the next section. According to it, it is quotation marks that are linguistic expressions, 
susceptible of being in the standing for or referring to relation; whole quotations are not, because 
they include what in fact is a mere extra-linguistic index that helps to determine the referent. 
Now, the expression quoted by the grammatical subject of (5) is a whole quotation: the opening 
quote followed by ‘Socrates’ followed by the closing quote. But that, according to DO, is not a 
term that is in the standing for relation to anything – only part of it, the quotation marks, are; 
moreover, all by themselves, out-of-context, they do not refer to ‘Socrates’ or to anything else. A 
related problem is that instances of (5) need not be true according to DO, because the subject-
term might in some contexts refer to an item that doesn’t refer to what the object-term refers to.  
García-Carpintero provides a reply that Gómez-Torrente (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 
134) anticipates.9 Gómez-Torrente retorted that this places DO in a comparatively less attractive 
position vis-à-vis DT.10 I will go back to this in the next section, in which I’ll show also that, 
however damaging the objection is for DO, the alleged problem also afflicts DT. My reply, 
further developed below, was in a nutshell that the intuitions on which the argument relies are 
not sensitive enough to the distinction between properly linguistic expressions, part of the 
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expressive system of a particular natural language, and expressive resources in general, mere 
signs. A quotation referred to by the grammatical subject of (5) in the contexts where these 
intuitions are prompted is indeed such a sign, “referring” in an extended sense to ‘Socrates’. This 
suffices for a theoretical account to adequately honor such pretheoretical, undiscriminating 
intuitions; the only real issue is whether, overall, it provides a better explanation of all relevant 
facts.  
I will come back in the next two sections to this and related objections to DO, comparing the 
pros and cons of the two theories. But we have now enough to motivate and state the main tenet 
of DT, aimed at capturing the intuitions that prompt such objections. This is what Gómez-
Torrente (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 146; “Double-duty Quotation, Conventional 
Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 142; “How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 370) calls 
Interiority Principle, IP; I also provide Cappelen and Lepore’s (Language Turned on Itself, op. 
cit., p. 124) equivalent Quotation Schema, QS.11 It tightly compacts DT’s answers to 
Washingston’s three questions: 
(IP) The quotation of an expression refers to the quoted expression. 
(QS) ‘e’ quotes/refers to e 
Full quotations – quotation-marks plus quoted material – are on DT the referring expressions; 
they refer to the quoted material they enclose, by a sort of identity function (Bazzoni, “Pure 
quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, op. cit., p. 124). Gómez-Torrente stresses that by 
‘expression’ in IP he doesn’t mean lexical item, or word, but rather an abstract type (“How 
Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 374) instantiated by the quoted token, a “linguistically relevant 
graphical expression type to which the quoted token belongs” (“Double-duty Quotation, 
Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 149), which might not be a lexical item 
in the language of the quotation, or any other. On this basis, he (ibid., pp. 139-40) takes (2) – in 
which the quotations refer to two different graphic articulations of what any sensible account 
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would count as the same lexical item – to be a standard example of pure quotation, in which the 
quotations have their semantic referents in accordance with IP, in contrast to (3)-(4), which he 
accounts for instead as cases in which the intuitive referent is a speaker referent distinct from the 
semantic referent (ibid., p. 152); I’ll come back to this distinction and its methodological 
consequences in the final section.  
It may not be obvious that the core assumptions of DT allow the quoted material not to be a 
word. A main goal of Gómez-Torrente’s (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit.) account of reference 
fixing in quotation is to address this worry, which, as he shows, was left unaddressed in 
Cappelen and and Lepore’s (Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.) book-length treatment of the 
issue. Like Richard (“Quotation, Grammar, and Opacity,” op. cit.) previously, Gómez-Torrente 
(“Quotation revisited,” op. cit.) takes DT to develop the classical Quine-Tarski “name” view of 
quotation. Both take quotations to be structured, but argue that this structure is not syntactical: it 
is irrelevant to a compositional account of how the meaning of complex expressions depends on 
the meaning of their constituents and mode of composition. The structure is rather “lexical” 
(Richard) or “morphological” (Gómez-Torrente). According to DT the quoted material is a 
constituent of the quotation, but not a syntactico-semantic one, and hence it doesn’t need to be a 
word.12  
The fact that quotations are nonetheless structured according to DT deals – as Gómez-
Torrente (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., pp. 383-390) carefully explains – with Davidsonian 
objections to the Quine-Tarski classical name account based on the productivity and “pictoricity” 
of the device.13 In support of DT, Gómez-Torrente provides other examples of referring 
expressions that, while they are morphologically structured, and this structure is productively 
invoked for reference fixing, are nonetheless syntactically and semantically unstructured. 
Richard (ibid.) already mentioned the most obvious example, Arabic numerals; Gómez-Torrente 
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(ibid., pp. 376-383) provides other interesting examples, such as some conventions for streets or 
personal names. 
By not taking the quoted material to be a lexical item, proponents of DT can accept part of the 
evidence adduced for demonstrative accounts, viz., that quotations refer to items which are not 
expressions of the language to which they belong – or any other language. We quote in English 
first-order sentences, Chinese expressions, or objects that are not expressions of any language. 
On Gómez-Torrente’s view, all these cases would be covered by instances of IP in which the 
quotations refer to the “linguistically relevant abstract graphic type” which is the quoted 
material. Other versions of DT are more liberal. Unlike Gómez-Torrente, Cappelen and Lepore 
(ibid., p. 23) take pictures to also be semantically quoted. Unlike both of them, in more recent 
work Richard accepts that quotations can also semantically refer to tokens, and suggests dealing 
with this by invoking a version of IP on which the quoted material is a token, to which the 
quotation as a whole refers.14 Bazzoni (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, op. 
cit., p. 124) advances a single principle, assuming that the quotable “semantic entities” that may 
occur as non-syntactic constituents of quotations might include particulars such as physical 
objects (ibid., 120, 127), in addition to graphical or acoustic types.  
But no version of DT, however liberal, can account for examples like (3) and (4) in its 
proprietary terms, for the item intuitively referred to is not contained in the quotation. Besides, as 
next section shows, liberality comes at a price: the views are thereby exposed to variants of the 
very objections that their proponents raise against DO, based on the alleged intuitive truth of (5). 
In fact, as I’ll argue, even Gómez-Torrente’s less liberal version has also to pay this price. 
Both the DO and DT theories of pure quotation – presented above in terms of their answers to 
Washington’s three questions – account for the traditional uncontested pieces of data. Quotations 
do not pose a special problem for a compositional account of the semantics of natural language;15 
they are a productive and systematic device, and a somehow “pictoric” one, in that general rules 
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determine their referents on the basis of features of the meaning-vehicle; entities other than 
linguistic expressions can be quoted. In section 2 I will address objections against DO based on 
the intuitive truth of claims such as (5), arguing that DT doesn’t have an advantage there. In 
section 3 I will consider the merits and demerits of the two views. I will reply to Gómez-
Torrente’s methodological argument for DT by contending that, on methodological grounds, we 
should prefer DO instead, given DT’s unprincipled contrast between semantic and speaker 
reference in pure quotation, and their comparatively equal standing on other issues.  
 
 
2. DO and DT on the Intuitive Truth of Disquotational Principles 
 
Quotations are ambiguous in a pre-theoretical sense. The views we are discussing provide 
however different theoretical accounts of this pre-theoretical ambiguity, only on some of which 
they count as properly ambiguous. Thus, compare (2), repeated below as (6), with (7): 
(6) Use ‘Velázquez’, not ‘Velásquez’. 
(7) ‘Velázquez’ is the name of a famous Spanish painter. 
It is natural to take the quotation occurring as subject in (7) as referring to a word, a proper 
name; while in (6) what intuitively looks like the same quotation refers instead to a particular 
way of graphically articulating it. This is one to be distinguished from the one referred to by the 
second quotation in (6) – a different way of graphically articulating the same word, reproducing 
the way the name is acoustically articulated in the Spanish spoken in Latin America and parts of 
Spain. On DO, this ambiguity is just a form of context-dependence. Not so for those proponents 
of DT who (unlike Gómez-Torrente, as I’ll explain momentarily) appeal to IP/QS to explain the 
expressed intuition about ‘ ‘Velázquez’ ’ in (6) and (7). For them, the subject-term of (7) and the 
first quotation in (6) are different expressions, no matter what it intuitively seems; for they refer 
 - 9 - 
to different items, and, in accordance with IP/QS, they do so by containing as non-syntactic parts 
those distinct items: the word, in (7); a specific graphic articulation thereof, in (6). As Gómez-
Torrent (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 370) puts it, “Interiority does not provide a method 
for assigning a reference to an utterance of a quotation as a function of an aspect of its context; 
Interiority assigns a reference to each quotation type, independently of any sensitivity to 
contextual factors”.  
Gómez-Torrente himself, however, rejects the impression of ambiguity about the subject 
terms of (6) and (7) (p. c.): he takes both to refer to the same “linguistically relevant” graphical 
type. He (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 151 
fn.) nonetheless grants that quotations might also refer to words, and hence end up being “mildly 
ambiguous, or polysemous”, which is what (6) and (7) are meant to illustrate.16 In any case, he 
cannot sensibly deny some measure of “ambiguity”, given potential disparities in what counts as 
“linguistically relevant graphical types” instantiated in different contexts by what intuitively is 
the same expression. Are ‘Velazquez’ and ‘Velazquez’ one, or two linguistically relevant 
graphical types? It depends. In some contexts, the difference between boldface and normal types 
is linguistically significant (it might signal stress), while in others is irrelevant. What about 
‘Velázquez’ and ‘velázquez’? Ditto; it might be linguistically significant that words in some 
categories get their first letters in uppercase, or it might be irrelevant. What about ‘Velázquez’ 
and ‘Belázquez’? Ditto; in some contexts, spelling differences that do not correspond anymore to 
phonetic differences might be linguistically irrelevant. 
I have placed ‘ambiguity’ inside scare quotes throughout this discussion because, as indicated 
above, if governed by IP quotations cannot really be ambiguous. When a quotation refers to a 
word, and when what looks like the same quotation refers instead to a graphic articulation 
thereof, according to IP the terms doing the quoting are in fact different, for they contain the 
distinct entities they refer to; so there is no real ambiguity in such cases. There never is on DT, 
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for the reason Gómez-Torrente provides above: two quotations signifying two different semantic 
referents in accordance with IP/QS must themselves be distinct. On DT, the apparent ambiguity 
is thus “pre-semantic”, as with the intuitive ambiguity of ‘David’ when correctly used to refer to 
Hume and to Lewis on the “multiple homonyms” view of proper names propounded by Kaplan, 
Kripke and others, on which they share similarly articulated but different words.17 As Kaplan 
puts it, context is here “regarded as determining what word was used” rather than as “fixing the 
content of a single context-sensitive word”.18 An alternative indexical view of names treats them 
instead the way DO does for the intuitive ambiguity in (6)-(7): ‘David’ as applied to Hume and 
Lewis is one and the same indexical word, with a character that determines the referent given a 
contextually “dubbing in force”.19 
Theoretically the difference between these two views is significant, but proponents of DT are 
sometimes misleading or plainly confused when it comes to appraising its relevance for deciding 
between it and demonstrative accounts on intuitive grounds. Consider Cappelen and Lepore 
(Language Turned on Itself, op. cit.). In sync with their tirades against contextualist views in 
their (previous!) work on the semantics-pragmatics divide, they reject the notion that quotations 
are context-dependent. More specifically, they reject the following principle (ibid., 68), which 
DO of course endorses: 
(QCS)  Let S be a sentence with a quotation Q, containing no context-sensitive expressions other 
than possibly Q. Two utterances, u and u', of S can express different propositions because 
Q in u and in u' quotes different items. 
This denial notwithstanding, and at first sight paradoxically, they accept some of the data 
emphasized by DO, suggestive of the truth of QCS. Unlike Gómez-Torrente, they accept that the 
subject-term of (7) and the first quotation in (6) refer to different entities. They also accept that, 
while in some contexts (8) below might be true, in more ordinary contexts it is rather its negation 
which is true, because the expression on the right-hand side of the identity sign does not refer to 
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the linguistic expression ‘Madrid’, but rather to its written articulation in a specific font, Verdana 
(ibid., 77-9). For them, this is a semantic phenomenon, not merely a pragmatic one – unlike on 
Gómez-Torrente’s view, who, as we will see in more detail in the next section, takes the 
impression of contextual variation in reference here to have a pragmatic explanation: 
(8) ‘Madrid’ = ‘Madrid’. 
Cappelen and Lepore’s (ibid., ch. 12) way of making their rejection of QCS consistent with 
their acceptance of these data appeals to the point previously made. Quotations might include 
“quotable items” which, although “signs”, are not “expressions” (lexemes, or words). Quotations 
literally have those quotable items – some of them non-expressions – as parts. Thus, to get the 
result that (8) is false, and its negation true, given IP/QS the quotable items included in the 
quotations on one and the other side of the identity sign should differ; but this means that the 
quotations themselves differ, which is how the rejection of QCS can be upheld: when the quoted 
items differ, the quotations doing the quoting differ too. 
As a way of theoretically accommodating part of the data suggestive of context-dependence 
that demonstrative accounts highlight, while preserving the context-independence of accounts 
relying on IP/QS, Cappelen and Lepore’s proposal is of course acceptable. However, as a means 
to gain advantage over demonstrative views, it is rather Pickwickian. This becomes manifest 
when we confront some of the arguments that they deploy against such views. 
A first argument is related to the one by Gómez-Torrente presented in the previous section in 
order to motivate IP. Cappelen and Lepore argue that demonstrative views accepting the wide-
ranging context-dependence that DO assumes “cannot guarantee the truth of (dis)quotational 
sentences”, such as (9), because, on such views, it “should be on a par with” (10) (ibid., 69): 
(9) ‘ ‘Quine’ ’ quotes ‘Quine’. 
(10) ‘that’ demonstrates that. 
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The reply to this on behalf of DO goes along the lines of the one I mentioned in section 1 as a 
rejoinder to Gómez-Torrente’s (“Quotation revisited,” op. cit., p. 133; “How Quotations Refer,” 
op. cit., p. 359) version of this argument. There is a significant difference between (10) and (9), 
as emphasized in the previous section: instances of (9) always include by themselves adequate 
indexes to act as demonstrata, unlike instances of (10). As a result, the default demonstrative rule 
for quotations (DDR) can always safely operate in any context in which (9) is uttered. Utterances 
of (9) are hence true in such default contexts.20 This explains perfectly well the intuitions of an 
asymmetry between (9) and (10). It also explains the intuition that (9) is true “as a matter of 
meaning alone” (op. cit., 70), when we leave this claim – as we should when discussing 
intuitions – at a merely intuitive level. 
Cappelen and Lepore relatedly object (ibid., 69) that according to demonstrative views there 
are false instances of QS; (11) might be a case in point, in the suggested context: 
(11) ‘ ‘Quine’ ’ quotes/refers to ‘Quine’. 
In reply, I note first that I do not see any non-question-begging reason why this prediction is 
wrong. It would be good to have experimental data on this; for what is worth, my bet is that 
ordinary speakers would simply feel confused if we ask them whether an utterance of (11) is 
true, and also that many would find it false if we set up a context that makes it salient that the 
Verdana version of the name is a candidate referent for the second quotation, like those Cappelen 
and Lepore themselves (ibid., p. 152) provide. Be this as it may, what is more relevant for 
present purposes is that Cappelen and Lepore in fact agree that some utterances of (11) are 
false! They (ibid., pp. 153-4) argue that this does not contradict the truth of (9) “as a matter of 
meaning alone”, because in false utterances of (11) different quotations are at stake: the 
quotation that is part of the subject is not the same as the one used as the object, hence they are 
not true instances of QS.  
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But how can this be taken as an advantage of DT over DO in explaining pre-theoretical 
intuitions? Given DO, there are false instances of QS, such as an utterance of (11) in the 
envisaged context; what determines whether we have a true or a false instance of QS is whatever 
fixes the interpretation of demonstratives (speakers’ intentions, coordinating intentions, context). 
Given DT, all proper instances of QS are true. An utterance of (11) could either be an instance of 
QS, and then true, or false, and then not a true instance of QS; and what determines whether it is 
one or the other is whatever grounds the pre-semantic facts, i.e., whatever fixes what the quoted 
material is. As far as we can tell (they do not say), it will be exactly the same sort of thing: 
intentions, coordinating intentions or what have you. In any case, as illustrated by the 
disagreements among advocates of DT with respect to what counts as a proper instance of QS 
(whether the variables stand for linguistically graphic types, words, or anything) these are 
matters that could only be decided on the basis of complex theoretical considerations. 
It is a serious methodological mistake to assume that speakers’ intuitions that are acceptable 
empirical data for semantics can decide which one of these proposals is right, because the 
differences between them lie at a theoretical level that is far beyond the scope of such intuitions. 
At the intuitive level, both DO and DT accept violations of QS, because intuitions do not tell 
apart in the required way the expressions quoted on the left side and used on the right side; 
intuitively quotations are ambiguous, whether or not they really are theoretically so. 
In this section I have argued that DT doesn’t have any advantage over DO when it comes to 
accounting for the disquotational intuitions that motivate the theory. To the extent that they can 
be taken as genuine data for linguistic theories, such intuitions find “ambiguity” in quotation, 
and as a result intuitively potential exceptions to disquotational principles. There is no 
compelling reason to prefer DO’s account of the data in terms of genuine ambiguity (context-
dependence) to DT’s “pre-semantic” explanation.  
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Cappelen and Lepore’s more liberal views than Gómez-Torrente’s on the matter of what can 
be the semantic referents of quotations make it easier to make these points, which is why I have 
focused more on their views in this section. Perhaps this partly explains Gómez-Torrente’s claim 
that quotations semantically refer only to “linguistically relevant graphical types”. But note first 
that this might seem ad hoc.21 There is no good reason I can see why, given DT, in accordance 
with IP/QS, quotations cannot refer to words. There are ways of indicating quotation in speech, 
some of them as far as I can tell as conventional as quotation-marks – i.e., intonation.22 In any 
case, the fact that quotation is more easily indicated in written language doesn’t entail that words 
cannot be named by such means. It seems to me that only an a priori allegiance to IP explains 
Gómez-Torrente’s choice of semantic referents for quotations. I find it less ad hoc for 
proponents of DT to adopt Bazzoni’s (“Pure quotation, metalanguage and metasemantics”, op. 
cit.) stance, shunning any ontological commitment on what the quotable “semantic objects” 
might be – graphical types, acoustic types, lexical items, or what have you, including tokens and 
other physical items. This creates more occasions for the intuitive ambiguity that I have pointed 
out, but it is consonant with disquotational intuitions. Be this as it may, as argued above, given 
the vagueness/openness of ‘relevant’, Gómez-Torrente’s choice cannot make him entirely free 
from some cases of such intuitive ambiguity. As I will argue in the concluding section, his more 
constrained choice of semantic referents doesn’t free him as a result from the indictment of 
methodological misjudgment – unwarranted reliance on intuitions. 
 
 
3. DO and DT on Semantic and Speaker Reference in Pure Quotation 
 
Gómez-Torrente presents the most damaging assumption by DO that he takes issue with thus 
(my emphasis): “the demonstrative phrases of Davidsonian analyses can in principle refer in 
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some contexts to things that quotations (or quotation marks) as a matter of conventional 
principle cannot refer to in any context” (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 359). As we have 
seen, he wants what intuitively is one and the same quotation, such as the first in (6) and the 
subject-term in (7), to semantically refer (“as a matter of conventional principle”) to just one 
entity, a “linguistically relevant graphical type”. Other possible referents are accounted for as 
speaker referents. But this aspiration is doomed to failure, and as a result the indictment of 
Cappelen and Lepore’s proposal applies also to his, even if the number of examples that 
establish it is smaller.  
Thus, consider an apparent instance of QS such as (12), in a context in which it is made clear 
(say, by running commentaries while one writes it on a board in a discussion of this topic) that 
the quotation mentioned in the subject is intended to behave as the subject-term of (7), while the 
one used in the object-term works instead like the first one in (6); i.e., the quotation mentioned in 
the subject-term is intended to refer to a word, while the one used as the object-term is intended 
to refer to a particular graphical articulation thereof, so that the utterance is intuitively false: 
(12) ‘ ‘Velázquez’ ’ refers to ‘Velázquez’. 
From a pre-theoretical perspective, on which quotations are (pre-theoretically) ambiguous and 
validate QCS, the quotation used as the object-term in such a case is the same expression as the 
one mentioned in the subject. There of course are contexts in which the expressions they both 
refer to are also the same (say, one and the same graphical type); but there also appear to be 
contexts, such as the one just described, in which both differ. Such cases falsify the 
disquotational schema at the relevant, pre-theoretical level.  
Of course, both Cappelen and Lepore and Gómez-Torrente deny that in those cases we are 
confronting true instances of IP/QS,23 but, as argued in the previous section, this is neither here 
nor there. Cappelen and Lepore (Language Turned on Itself, op. cit., pp. 69-70) say: “to be told 
that we’re not guaranteed of the truth of a quotation sentence like [(12)] as a matter of meaning 
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alone, will surprise most competent speakers”. However, if we use only notions available to 
ordinary competent speakers, their own view delivers surprising news of this kind. In a similar 
vein, Gómez-Torrente (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 359) complains: “it is not guaranteed 
purely by Davidsonian theory that apparently context-independent disquotational truisms such as 
[(12)] are true”. But, as we have just seen, this is not guaranteed either by the version of DT that 
he subscribes to. Even if we grant him that quotations must refer to linguistically relevant 
graphical types, we could make the same point by relying in the vagueness of ‘relevant’, as 
pointed out in the previous section. 
Hence, if there is a cost here, it is a cost both for DO and DT, in any version. The fact that no 
violation of the schema occurs when “expression” and “ambiguity” are theoretically 
disambiguated along the lines of (a particular version of) DT is in no way an advantage for 
theories holding it, first and foremost on account of the point that I have been emphasizing: 
ordinary speakers’ intuitive judgments empirically relevant for semantic theorizing do not deploy 
such theoretically elaborate notions. Besides, DO can claim that same spurious virtue: no 
violation of proper instances of the schema occurs either when the disambiguation is made on its 
basis. Ordinary demonstrative sentences obtained by replacing the outermost quotes in (12) with 
‘this expression’ need not be true in contexts in which the quotation mentioned in the subject 
invokes for reference-fixing a different index from the quotation used in the object. In any case, 
the alleged virtue is spurious: if it is true that ordinary speakers make the judgment that 
sentences with the apparent form of (12) are “analytic”, both DO and DT agree that they are 
wrong and need to be corrected; and both honor a theoretically nuanced form of the judgment. 
To evaluate another criticism of DO that Gómez-Torrente makes, and a related reason he 
provides to prefer his version of DT vis-à-vis Cappelen and Lepore’s, we need to go into the 
distinction between semantic and speaker reference, and how it applies to demonstratives. The 
complaint against DO is that it “seems to attribute excessive referential possibilities to 
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quotations” (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 
144). He illustrates this by contrasting a case in which one points to a token of ‘Velázquez’, and 
utters (13), with one in which one makes a spoken utterance of (14); unlike the former case, he 
says, in the latter “it seems one can’t … successfully convey to one’s audience the intended true 
proposition that Velázquez was a great painter, or at least one can’t do this without adding 
complicated peculiarities to the contextual setting” (ibid., 145): 
(13) This man was a great painter. 
(14) ‘Velázquez’ was a great painter. 
Another example contrasts “This boldface type is a very dark boldface”, said while 
demonstrating a normal, non-bold face Times New Roman token of ‘Velázquez’, with an 
utterance of “‘Velázquez’ is a very dark boldface”. While in the former case “I can easily convey 
and perhaps semantically express the (let’s suppose, true) proposition that the boldface version 
of Times New Roman “Velázquez” is a very dark boldface”, in the latter I cannot “easily manage 
even to convey that proposition, as I probably require a fairly complicated contextual setting to 
do so” (ibid., 145-6). Note, for later use, that in both cases Gómez-Torrente’s point is nuanced: 
not that what is possible with ordinary demonstratives is impossible with quotation marks, but 
only that the latter is more difficult and requires special contexts. This is as it should be, because 
he himself provides good examples of contexts in which the relevant propositions would be 
conveyed. This is ok for him, because his claim is merely that, although quotations might refer in 
the ways indicated, these are cases of speaker reference, requiring contrived contexts. 
Gómez-Torrente’s criticism of Cappelen and Lepore’s version of DT is the contrasting one, 
that it is “insufficient” (ibid., 148). I agree with this criticism, which DO upholds, but not with 
his proposal to deal with it in terms of speaker reference; as I will argue, the relevant cases 
involve semantic reference, assuming that this notion applies to demonstratives. Gómez-
Torrente’s criticism of Cappelen and Lepore is that, as examples (3)-(4) illustrate, we can use 
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quotations to refer not just to types distinct from linguistic expressions as in (2)/(6), but also to 
entities distinct from those contained in the quotation, no matter how liberal a notion of part we 
are using. Consider for example (15), about which Cappelen and Lepore say that they and their 
informants find it impossible (or very difficult) to get a true reading (ibid., 72): 
(15)  ‘I’ tastes like peach. 
It is difficult for me to make sense of the problems that Cappelen and Lepore report, for I do not 
hard at all to find contexts in which an utterance of (15) appears to be true. Just imagine that we 
are speaking about the items in a bag of sweets, in the shape of letters. Not much imagination is 
needed to contemplate true utterances of (4) above either; I’ll mention one below.  
 However, the semantic account that IP/QS affords for (6) is unavailable for these cases, 
because the quoted item is not part of the quotation. Cappelen and Lepore (ibid., 76) consider 
explaining them in terms of familiar pragmatic strategies, but reject it, so they are left without 
any account for these cases – which is, I suspect, the true source of their imaginative limitations. 
Gómez-Torrente (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. 
cit., pp. 152-6) provides a detailed elaboration of the first pragmatic proposal (“conversational 
implicature”) that they consider, in terms of Kripke’s (1977) notion of speaker reference: while 
the quotation keeps its semantic referent (the relevant “linguistically relevant graphical type”), 
and hence what is said is false, the speaker manages to convey a truth about the intuitive referent 
by relying on Gricean mechanisms. I’ll come back to Gómez-Torrente’s account presently. But 
whatever the outcome of this debate among proponents of DT, the main problem for all of them 
lies in justifying the asymmetries in their accounts of these cases, (6) on the one hand, (3)-(4) on 
the other. Once one accepts as a genuine semantic phenomenon the (more or less restricted) pre-
theoretical semantic context-dependence they are prepared to concede, it is unprincipled not to 
grant the one they reject.  
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How are the semantic referents of demonstratives fixed? This is of course a hugely 
controversial topic.24 I’ll assume for present purposes that this is a matter of the intentions of the 
speaker, in the qualified way articulated by Bach and elaborated by others including Perry and 
Speaks.25 For o to be the semantic referent of demonstrative d in context c two conditions must 
be met. (i) The speaker intends o to be the value of d in c. (ii) The speaker intends that his 
audience take o to be the value of d in c. The latter intention is rationally constrained: rational 
speakers must justifiably believe that what they do make its fulfillment more probable than it 
would otherwise be.26 
Applied to quotation marks understood as dedicated demonstratives, this proposal validates 
DDR at the outset, and it provides adequate responses to Gómez-Torrente’s objections that DO 
entails excessive referential possibilities. Note first that quotation marks are dedicated 
demonstratives; we can think of them as coming with the sortal “expression”, understood in the 
intuitive fully general sense in which it applies to tokens and types that are not words. Note also 
that the view just outlined about demonstratives allows for the distinction between speaker and 
semantic reference; for instance, cases that Speaks (“The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the 
Character of Demonstratives,” op. cit., pp. 305-6) describes as of “insufficient intentions”, in 
which speakers intend to refer to something but fail to provide sufficient grounds to their 
audiences to pick it out, are cases of speaker reference without semantic reference.27 
Let me now explain the contrast between “This boldface type is a very dark boldface”, said 
while demonstrating a normal, non-bold face Times New Roman token of ‘Velázquez’, and 
“‘Velázquez’ is a very dark boldface”. In the first case, the sortal in the complex demonstrative 
guides by itself a competent, reasonable and attentive audience to the intended referent, so both 
conditions are met. Not so in the latter case; in any normal context the second condition cannot 
be taken to be satisfied, when the intended referent is the boldface type Times New Roman. But 
of course, there are “complicated contextual settings” in which it is satisfied, and that type is the 
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semantic referent. Gómez-Torrente (“Double-duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and 
What Is Said,” op. cit., p. 146) provides one: a number of fonts are being discussed, and every 
font is represented by the written name of a different painter. Similar points can be made about 
the contrast between (13) and (14): it makes a difference for the satisfaction of the two 
conditions on semantic reference for the demonstrative whether it is the sortal presupposed for 
quotation marks or the one explicit in ‘that man’ that is taken into consideration. But again, it is 
not that difficult to think of “complicated” settings in which (14) is true. Imagine for instance 
that we are giving examples of three-syllables words that we like, and the reasons why: 
‘platypus’ sounds nice; ‘resentment’ is my favorite emotion; ‘Velázquez’ is a great painter. 
I’ll conclude with a further relevant observation. Saul suggests a test for semantic content, 
based on the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading, which Michaelson has refined.28 
What does it tell us about the semantic character or otherwise of reference by means of 
quotations to expressions not contained in them, as in (3)-(4)? It seems clear to me that we 
intuitively lie, and not merely mislead, when we utter (4) or (15) knowing very well that what we 
are saying about the relevant tokens is false, with the intention to deceive, in contexts in which 
the “question under discussion” (Andreas Stokke, “Lying and Misleading in Discourse,” 
Philosophical Review CXXV (2016): pp. 83-134) involves the relevant information. Thus, 
imagine (4) uttered by someone looking with binoculars at the marquee in a movie theater 
projecting a Batman movie, whose answer will decide a bet on the colors of the words in the 
marquee, knowing that ‘Batman’ is in fact painted red. 
Let us take stock. There are significant differences in the accounts of quotation that DT and 
DO provide. DO accounts on equal terms for the contribution of quotations to semantic content 
in (2), in (3)-(4) and in both true and false utterances of (8). The version of DT that Cappelen and 
Lepore defend provides an account of (2) and (8), but tells us nothing about (3)-(4). The version 
that Gómez-Torrente defends does explain (3)-(4), and the intuitively false utterances of (8) – 
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which he also takes to involve speaker reference, because he takes the semantic referents of both 
quotations to be the same “linguistically relevant graphical type” (Gómez-Torrente, “Double-
duty Quotation, Conventional Implicatures and What Is Said,” op. cit., p.  158-9). But his 
account also invidiously taxonomizes the cases into two different categories, equally on account 
of whether or not the reference is determined by means of IP/QS, i.e., of whether or not the 
referent can be identified with the quoted material. 
If these writers commit themselves to psychological mechanisms implementing the processes 
they posit,29 their views have empirical consequences. What do the empirical facts tell us about 
them? At the phenomenological level, I am not aware of any difference in my experiences when 
I interpret quotations in each of those categories, and, as I have been insisting, I find it 
methodologically unwarranted to ascribe such awareness to the intuitive judgments of ordinary 
speakers. There could certainly be processing differences at a subpersonal level, and it would be 
very nice to investigate the issue. But the authors I am discussing do not provide any evidence of 
that kind. What, then, should our temporary conclusion be? 
Gómez-Torrente’s (“How Quotations Refer,” op. cit., p. 353) methodological case against 
other theories of quotation charges that they make quotation “an eccentric or anomalous 
phenomenon”. My main claim against DT in this paper turns the tables on him. I have provided 
what I take to be a decisive rejoinder to objections to DO by proponents of DT, showing that 
their proposals fare no better on the relevant eccentricities. And I have shown in addition that all 
versions of DT establish an asymmetry in the interpretation of quotations, dividing them into two 
groups, for which their proponents have not so far given any justification. On methodological 
grounds therefore, and to my taste at least, as far as we can now tell DO still delivers the 
loveliest account. 
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